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Chapter 3
Implications for Long-term Investors of the
Shifting Distribution of Capital Market
Returns
James Moore and Niels Pedersen
It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.
(attributed to Yogi Berra)

Despite the caution from Hall of Fame baseball player cum philosopher Mr. Berra,
few people have stopped trying to predict the future. And nowhere is prediction more
common than in the financial markets. One cannot watch financial television for more
than an hour without a guest being asked where he believes the level of the S&P 500,
an individual stock, the price of gold, or the ten-year Treasury yield will be at year-end.
Given the vagaries of the market, short-term forecasting, particularly for high volatility assets, is little more than a toss of the dice. The media soon forget the many whose
predictions are off the mark. The few whose prognostications end up close to the mark
are ascribed sage-like properties and develop cults of followers. While short-run forecasting has value for financial entertainment and speculation, in the United States and
much of the developed world, there is perhaps no field where long-run forecasting has
wider implications for personal welfare than that of forecasting asset returns.
The expected returns of stocks, bonds, and other investments play a critical role
in retirement planning, budgeting, and determining future savings adequacy. Of
course, practitioners in the space—plan sponsors, investment advisors, consultants,
asset managers, and others versed in statistics—know that future returns are random variables. Actual returns through time are drawn from a distribution of possibilities. Given this fact, outcomes that are functions of the realized returns are
themselves distributions of random variables. The specific form of the ultimate
distribution in question relies on (a) the stochastic processes governing the returns
themselves, (b) the functional form that these returns are ‘filtered’ through, and
possibly (c) convolutions of multiple functional forms. Even when the underlying
stochastic processes are known with certainty and the generating distributions are
well behaved, the transforming nature of the real-world functions overlaid can lead
to significant alterations of the resultant distributions. In some cases this may compress distributions; in others it may lead to tails that are exaggerated.
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Yet it is important to remember that we do not know the true statistical generating process
of asset returns. The vast majority of work done by practitioners relies on the lessons
learned in undergraduate statistics courses. The insights absorbed there rely heavily on the Law of Large Numbers and asymptotic convergence to normality. These
in turn rely on the stronger assumptions of stationarity and ergodicity. What if
these do not hold?
To explore this question, this chapter looks at the implications of long horizon
asset returns that flow from three different generating processes for stock and bond
returns.1 The first, a multivariate normal distribution, is widely used due to its
familiarity and analytic tractability and has been used for Monte Carlo statistical
analyses since the Second World War. The second, a block bootstrap approach,
has become more common in the past few decades with increases in computing
power and questions as to the appropriateness of normality given limited historical data. The third approach uses a nested structural model that links asset returns
to macroeconomic fluctuations in the real economy. The core of this model relies
on a non-stationary, Markov-switching evolution of real GDP as first modeled by
Hamilton (1994).
Each of these approaches has different pros and cons. The first approach
is easy to implement. The second makes heavy use of actual historical precedence and can capture short-intermediate-horizon autocorrelation and
cross-correlation structures. The third allows for the strongest linkage between
economic theory and simulation results, dynamic correlation behavior, and differential, conditional sub-period dynamics. But this comes with additional complexity in model design and calibration difficulty. In what follows we explore the
differences in model outcomes focusing on the behavior of distribution tails and
the implications for potentially differing intra-path dynamics. This may have
great importance for pensions. For defined benefit (DB) plans, this can meaningfully impact the magnitude and timing of required contributions. For defined
contribution (DC) plans, it can have meaningful welfare implications—especially
if there are behavioral responses to participant asset allocations around extreme
performance periods.

Preliminaries
Before we elaborate on model differences, it is worth spending some time looking
at the nature of uncertainty about the first moments of our return distributions. In
Figure 3.1, we see three different averages of historic real equity returns—rolling
ten- and 30-year geometric average returns, as well as the full sample geometric
average.2 Both rolling averages display quite a bit of variation. The ten-year numbers range from a low of −4.3 percent to a high of 17.9 percent. The 30-year numbers range from 3.1 percent to 9.9 percent and have deviated above or below the
full sample average of 6.5 percent for periods as long as 19 years.3
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Figure 3.1. Averages of S&P Composite real returns, 1871–2012.
Note: 1871–2010 data from Shiller (2013); 2010+ from Bloomberg (2013).
Source: Authors’ illustration.

Standard theory would instruct us to ‘use all the data.’ Yet while this may work
for a return series as long-lived and as widely followed as the S&P 500, note that
even here, the standard error of the estimate is 1.55 percent. If the meandering
of the rolling averages gives us reason to question stationarity, the standard error
could be still wider than that. For other return series—foreign markets or new asset
classes—30 years of reliable data may be difficult to obtain. Dimson et al. (2002)
contains a nice discussion of additional problems due to censoring, survivorship
bias, market discontinuities, and other factors that plague offshore equity markets,
even for developed economies.
The economic impact of such volatility on savers can be tremendous. Taking
the extremes of our 30-year rolling averages for illustration, imagine a 35-year-old
putting a dollar of her 401(k) in the S&P for a planned age-65 retirement. If she
assumes her dollar saved will grow at a conservative 3.1 percent per annum, it will be
worth 2.5 times as much in real dollars. At a more robust 9.9 percent, that dollar
would grow to $17.
It should be noted that a 30-year horizon is frequently cited in corporate and
public sector DB plans to justify future expected return assumptions that would
imply implausibly large forward-looking equity return spreads over available
risk-free debt of long maturities.4 Despite the market crashes of 2000–2002
and 2008–2009, the most recent 30-year real equity returns exceeded the very
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long-term average by 2.0 percent per annum. This is due to the power of the bull run
of the 1980s and 1990s. The 30-year horizon also conveniently leaves out the poor
returns in the 1970s. A similar story holds for bonds.
The focus on equity alone raises to some degree the question about expected
bond returns and the interplay between expected equity returns and bond returns.
A serious analysis of returns should not explore the return dynamics of stocks in
isolation. It should also analyze other investment choices and account for relevant
conditioning variables. Bonds play a role in both cases. The body of literature on
expected returns is large and growing (see Ilmanen 2011). A key implication of the
literature is that expected returns vary over time. Factors such as interest rates, the
spread between high yield and investment-grade debt, aggregate dividend yields
and earnings yields, and book-to-market ratios, for instance, all have some predictive power in forecasting stock returns. More recently, longer-term factors such as
demographic variables have been shown by Arnott and Chavez (2012), among others, to have some explanatory value.
In addition to uncertainty as to the ex ante mean, there is some uncertainty
regarding the long-run generating process and how uncertainty compounds over
time. There appears to be different behavior in the short run and the long run.
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) used variance ratios to demonstrate that returns show
positive serial correlation (momentum) over short horizons. Moreover, Poterba and
Summers (1988), Campbell and Viciera (2005), and others have demonstrated that
in long horizons there appears to be some evidence of mean reversion.
But even with conditioning variables, the specification of the ex ante mean
expected return is an imprecise exercise. If that is the case, how much faith can
we have in characterization of higher moments or distribution tails? In what follows, we first discuss the slow nature of convergence of financial variables to a true
mean, even if one assumes stationarity. Next we lay out our three different simulation approaches. A macroeconomic regime-switching model is introduced as a
mechanism to be able to capture both shorter-term and longer-term behavior of
financial markets. We then describe the two real-world filtrations of interest: (a) a
long-term glide path for a defined contribution plan, and (b) the funding and contribution impact over a more moderately long horizon for a corporate DB plan.
After a summary of the results, we compare the dynamics for the three model
approaches.

Slow Convergence to a True Mean
Uncertainty about the true mean or expected return is quantitatively large, even
if we assume that the annual stock return can be viewed as a realization from a
stationary distribution. The solid dark lines in Figure 3.2 show the 95 percent
confidence interval for the expected excess stock return based on a 16 percent
annual volatility and a sample average of 7 percent. The figure reminds us of the
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Figure 3.2. Slow convergence to true mean.
Note: 1871–2010 data from Shiller (2013); 2010+ from Bloomberg (2013).
Source: Authors’ illustration.

unnerving statistical uncertainties associated with some of the key parameters that
most simulation techniques take as given.
Of course, if the true process is not stationary, convergence can be even slower
still. Figure 3.2 also shows the convergence in estimation for another process with
true mean of 7 percent and volatility of 16 percent. In this case, the generating
process is a Markov-switching mixture of normal distributions where the two
sub-sample means are set at a level ±3.5 percent around our true mean (i.e. 3.5 percent and 10.5 percent). The parameters are chosen to correspond approximately to
the widest deviations of the 30-year rolling averages from the full sample mean in
the Shiller dataset (2013) shown previously.
A total of 10,000 150-year paths were run with starting draws equally split
between the high and low conditional mean return states. State transitions
occurred according to a two-state Markov chain set with p = q so that each state is
equally probable over the course of the simulation and the distribution of returns
is symmetric.5 Values of p and q are set at 0.90 (dashed line) and 0.95 (dotted line)
corresponding to average durations of the conditional states of ten and 20 years.
Bootstrap standard errors are calculated from the 10,000 simulation trails to construct confidence intervals.
We see that this generates consistently wider confidence intervals. At the 30-year
sample point, the ten-year average regime duration process would yield a confidence interval with a 1.93 percent wider spread (3.32 percent for the 20-year
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average duration process). Convergence is also slower: comparing the ratio of the
confidence intervals as the sample increases, at 30 years, the 20-year, slow switch
process is 29 percent wider than our baseline case; at 150 years it is 36 percent
wider.

Three Different Return-generating Models and
Their Results
We compare three different return-generating models—a multivariate normal
distribution model, a block bootstrap model which resamples from past historical data, and a third structural model that is designed and calibrated to capture a
number of economic features. The more involved macroeconomic long horizon
simulation model is described in some detail below, with a more detailed technical
appendix at the end of the chapter. The other two models, multivariate normal and
block bootstrap, are commonly used by both academics and practitioners and are
presented later as counterparts for comparison and evaluation of the more expansive macroeconomic approach. Limitations of both of these models provided the
impetus for the development of this modeling approach.

Macroeconomic Long Horizon Simulation (LHS)
Model
The premise of the macro-driven long horizon simulation model is that the dynamic
processes for macroeconomic growth, inflation, and risk aversion jointly determine
both the short-term dynamics as well as the variations in discount factors applied
to these cash flows in financial markets to form asset prices and valuations for both
risk-free and risky investments. When we impose restrictions and assumptions on
the dynamics of these fundamental variables that are based on theory and academic research, we indirectly imply a set of ‘structural’ restrictions for the long-term
valuations of asset prices, such as bond prices and equity prices, which restrict the
plausible range of average investment returns and volatility over a given investment
horizon. Cochrane (2011) contains a discussion of some these issues.
The secular dynamics of productivity growth or ‘potential’ GDP growth, inflation rates, and equilibrium risk premiums shape the distributions of real interest
rates and nominal interest rates and equity yields (dividends and earnings yields)
over a long-term investment horizon. Similarly, the business cycle dynamics of
unemployment, output gap, and central bank policy, as well as the accompanying temporary bouts of extreme uncertainty and risk aversion in financial markets,
shape the distribution of asset returns and yield curves in the short term.
A structural macroeconomic regime-switching (LHS) model combines these
guiding principles and ideas within a unified structural framework designed to
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Figure 3.3. Schematic of structural LHS process.
Source: Authors’ illustration.

remain highly empirically and quantitatively relevant. Figure 3.3 summarizes the
structure of the model at a high level.
This LHS model explicitly incorporates the main dynamic linkages between
economic growth and inflation, monetary policy, risk aversion, and realized
asset returns. In this way it provides a suitable framework for assessment of both
long-term and short-term distributions of asset returns and yields curves. The
framework allows us to quantify both the short-term and long-term tail risks that
strategic long-term investors face based on inputs for the main drivers of returns
(long-term growth, long-term inflation, and equity risk premium) and allows us to
explore the impact of parameter uncertainty.
A key feature of the model is the regime-switching component, which generates realistic business cycle dynamics in the model (see Hamilton 1989). The
regime-switching dynamics directly translate into realistic cyclical fluctuations in
inflation, GDP growth, and risk premiums. They also enable the model to more
closely match the higher frequency moments of asset returns distributions, as well
as the general correlations with macro variables over the business cycle. More specifically, such regime-switching models can produce the type of rapid changes in
risk premiums required to generate the ‘boom–bust’ characteristics of asset returns
experienced historically. The regime-switching behavior ultimately also generates
a strong tendency for mean reversion in average returns, and it reduces volatility of
those returns over long-term investment horizons. A more detailed description of
each component of the model is provided next.
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Macro Regimes
The business cycle dynamics are determined by a regime-switching model that
places the macro economy in either a ‘contraction’ or an ‘expansion,’ similar to the
specification first introduced by Hamilton (1989). One extension is that the transitions between these two regimes are governed by time-varying probabilities modeled with duration-dependent hazard functions. The duration dependence is such
that the hazard rate increases exponentially with the time the economy has been in
a specific regime. The probability that a specific recession or expansion comes to an
end consequently increases with the duration of the current stage of the business
cycle. The parameters of the hazard function for contractions and expansion are
calibrated to match the characteristics of National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) business cycle durations, both in terms of their average length and their
standard deviation. Since contractions tend to be shorter-lived than expansions,
the transition probabilities are inherently asymmetric.

Real Activity, Growth, and Output Gaps
The business cycle dynamics of real GDP growth are derived from the specification of a dynamic process for the output gap. In a recession, the output gap converges to a negative level, whereas it converges to a positive level in an expansion.
The specification that is used within regimes ensures that real GDP growth rate
is generally most negative at the beginning of a recession and most positive at the
beginning of an expansion. Overall the parameters are calibrated to match the distribution of real GDP growth and the distribution of output gap realizations within
both expansions and contractions. The long-term potential GDP growth is set to
an exogenous rate in the model, which can reflect forward-looking views on productivity growth or simply the historical growth rate of about 2 percent per year. In
principle the long-run growth rate can have its own dynamics.

Inflation
Inflation in the model has both a cyclical business cycle-driven component and
a persistent, long-term component. The business cycle component of inflation is
assumed to be driven by cyclical fluctuations in aggregate demand and, as such, it
is based on the simulated level of the output gap. A positive output gap is associated with high cyclical levels of inflation, whereas a large negative output gap will
reduce the inflation rate to a level below the long-term ‘structural’ inflation rate
that is prevailing at a given point in time. This feature of the model resembles the
well-known ‘Phillips’ curve from theoretical economic models. The long-run level
of realized inflation, and hence also the long-run level of inflation expectations, is
determined by shocks to a stationary but highly persistent process for non-business
cycle-related inflation fluctuations. Shocks to this process have a very significant
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impact on the expected inflation rates many years into the future, which are important in shaping the long-term distribution of nominal yields.

Monetary Policy
The central bank is assumed to respond to the cyclical components of inflation
and real activity. The response function is calibrated with a Taylor rule that implies
positive real rate responses to both the cyclical component of inflation and the output gap. Both effects will tend to push the Federal Reserve to reduce short-term
real rates in recessions (absent any short-term supply shocks to inflation) and
increase the short-term real rate in expansions. The current unusual monetary
policy stance, however, warrants an explicit adjustment to this general description
of monetary policy. The impact of quantitative easing (QE) is therefore explicitly
modeled. Specifically, for the two years until the end of 2014, our model assigns
only a small probability that the Fed exits its current stance (with a fixed fed funds
rate at 25 basis points) and raises the fed funds rate toward the level implied by
the Taylor rule. After that, it is assumed that the probability of exiting the regime
increases over time.

Yield Curve and Bond Returns
The nominal yield curve is derived as the expected future short rate plus an inflation risk term premium and a real rate risk term premium. The ‘expectations
component’ of the yield curve is implicitly derived from the expected dynamics
of the output gap and inflation because they ‘pass through’ the Taylor rule to the
expected future fed funds rate. As a consequence, the expectations component of
the yield curve responds to the current state of the business cycle and becomes
logically consistent with the specified dynamics for monetary policy, inflation, and
real activity. The business cycle dynamics of short maturity yields are dominated
by business cycle-driven fluctuations in expectations about monetary policy, which
creates interesting and very realistic endogenous dynamics in the yield curve simulations. For instance, at the beginning of an expansion the market will price additional rate increases resulting in a steepening yield curve, whereas at the beginning
of a recession the market will anticipate further easing of monetary policy over the
course of the recession and yield curves will potentially be inverted for some time
as the economy enters a contraction. Overall, the yield curve will be ‘steepest’ in
the middle of or at the end of a recession, whereas the curve will be ‘flattest’ in the
middle of an expansion. The current shape of the yield curve is consistent with our
modeling of QE.
The cyclical dynamics of long maturity yields in the model are, on the other
hand, mostly driven by fluctuations in inflation and real rate risk premiums, since
long-term expectations for real rates and inflation (and hence expectations for
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distant future policy rates) are fairly stable across the business cycle. This is consistent with empirical evidence suggesting that survey-based measures of long-term
expectations and real activity are quite constant over time and simply do not fluctuate enough to generate the observed volatility in long-term real and nominal yields
at annual frequencies.
While risk premiums fluctuate in the short run and drive dynamics in the short
run for long maturity yields, they remain fairly constant and are ‘bounded’ in the
long run. The main driver of any significant dispersion in the simulated long-run
dispersion of nominal yields is therefore gradual accumulation of small but persistent shocks to inflation. Generally speaking, significant changes in long-term
interest rate changes must be accompanied by persistent changes in the level of
inflation.
Finally, we note that, on average, long maturity bonds have higher expected
returns due to the maturity-dependent term premium that is specified in the model.
As a result of this risk premium, the average yield curve tends to be upward sloping at maturities out to about 20–25 years. After that convexity, effects in the yield
curve flattens the curve and cause even longer-term yields to decline gradually with
maturity.

Equity Returns
Equity prices are based on expected dividends discounted with the term structure of risk-free yields as well as the equity risk premium. The equity return
is composed of dividend yields plus capital appreciation (re-pricing of equities). Earnings growth is based on future GDP growth and mean reversion in
corporate profit margins. We assume a constant payout ratio for dividends.
Consequently, short-term earnings growth expectations will rationally fall when
the probability of entering a recession increases in the model, but long-term
earnings growth and dividend growth expectations do not fluctuate a lot over
time. The dominant component of equity returns and return volatility is the
‘re-pricing’ component of returns and the associated changes in the price to
‘stabilized’ earnings ratio. The dynamics of the P/E ratio are inherently linked
to the behavior of both long-term real rates and, especially, the dynamics of the
equity risk premium. The re-pricing return in a given period is approximately
equal to the change in the equity discount factor times the equity price duration with respect to yield and equity risk premium changes. The equity price
duration can be inferred from the discounted cash flow model but will be about
20–30 years depending on current valuations. In the recessionary regime, equity
risk premiums will tend to widen (capital loss) with higher volatility, but will
narrow (capital gain) in an expansion. Similarly, the volatility of risk aversion
levels and hence equity premiums are assumed to be higher in recessions than
expansions.

40

Recreating Sustainable Retirement

To summarize, most of the annual volatility in equity returns is due to the fluctuations in the discount rate and hence fluctuations of the equity risk premium and
long-term interest rates. The volatility is not due to shocks to expected future cash
flows. These features are consistent with the extensive body of academic research
associated with Robert Shiller.

Comparison to Alternative Simulation
Approaches
To highlight some of the major advantages of the macro-based approach to
long-run simulations we compare our simulation results with two simpler and more
commonly used approaches to simulation of both the yield curve and the equity
market returns. These approaches do not incorporate the same inter-temporal
structural relationships between equity returns and bond returns and macro variables that the macro model ‘enforces.’
One model which we can compare results with is a normal approximation to the
LHS model dynamics, where we match the average annual return, volatility, and
correlations of two-, five-, ten-, and 30-year maturity points on the yield curves,
as well as equity returns. A second model is a ‘bootstrap’ model, similar in that we
match the average return and volatility to the structural model, but this instead
samples historical quarterly data to also match the higher moments of the empirical distribution that a normal approximation may be missing. The bootstrap generally produces fatter tails in equity returns, since they are non-normal on an annual
basis. But for long-term investment horizons, the difference between the bootstrap
and normal approximation is small.
The structure of the LHS model serves to limit the plausible range of outcomes
over longer periods of time. It induces mean reversion in excess bond and equity
returns over time, which means that the long-run volatility of real returns decreases
with the investment horizon. For instance, following an increase in the equity risk
premium, investors are ‘hit’ by an immediate capital loss, but they face higher
returning investment opportunities afterwards. Similarly, a shock to interest rates
causes negative bond returns in the short run, but investors then face an environment with higher yields subsequently. Figure 3.4 shows how the term structure of
volatility is downward-sloping in our model, whereas it is flat in both the normal
model and the bootstrap model.
The downward-sloping term structure of volatility that the macro-based model
generates means that there are very large differences between the long-term predictions of the macro-based structural model and the two ‘naïve’ memoryless simulations of returns. Over time the cumulative volatility of returns explodes in both
of the non-structural, reduced-form approaches. This gives rise to exaggerated
tail behaviors in these two simulation approaches. This can be seen in Figure 3.5,
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Figure 3.4. Volatility term structure: equity returns.
Source: Authors’ illustration.

which shows the distribution of equity and bond returns from the three different
models.
For example, both the normal and bootstrap processes give roughly 5 percent
likelihoods of negative annualized equity returns over a 20-year horizon. It is difficult to imagine such persistence in an economy without a fundamental structural
shift in markets, given the implied long-term real capital decimation. Similarly,
the 95th percentile of 20-year annualized compounded equity returns is nearly
14 percent for both simple models. Here either growth or inflation would have to
be materially higher for a sustained economic period than we have witnessed, or
price–earnings ratios would eclipse historic levels. Similarly implausible relationships would have to hold to generate bond return behavior as seen at the outer
percentiles.
Importantly, the specific paths that generate the tail events in pure ‘engineering’
models, such as the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal distribution model, of asset price returns cannot be linked to a specific economic environment or assumption. It is not possible to assess whether the ‘tail’ outcomes are
reasonable from an economic standpoint as the fundamental economic parameters
that shape the distribution of returns are hidden from the visible eye. In the macro
model, it is much easier to pinpoint the economic assumptions that have to be made
to generate a given tail scenario, and hence to assess whether it is ‘plausible’ or not.
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Figure 3.5. Models’ distributions of equity and bond returns.
Note: Panel A: Annualized horizon equity returns; Panel B: Annualized horizon bond returns; Panel
C: Horizon annualized 60/40 returns.
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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Panel C. Horizon annualized 60/40 returns.
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Figure 3.5. (Continued)

Implications for Projections of DC and DB Plans
To get a sense of the impact of the three different return-generating processes in
real-world settings, we construct two examples: one for a DC plan and another
for a DB plan. The returns and yield curves generated by our models can then be
used to assess the impact on key decision variables used by plan sponsors. While
the annualized distributions of return dynamics are informative, without the overlay of the pension-specific models, key inferences may be missed. In addition, the
long-term nature of the pension saving/funding dynamic introduces a series of
other effects due to the changing dynamics of contributions. In the case of the DC
plan, the representative saver is increasing contributions though time as she ages
and presumably has a higher income from which to save. For the DB plan, there is
an endogenous, path-dependent relationship between contributions, asset returns,
and changes in the discount rate that can be highly non-linear through time.
For our DC case, we look at the cumulative savings dynamics of our return
process over a 40-year glide path.6 With the passage of the Pension Protection
Act (PPA) in 2006 and its codification of target date funds as Qualified Default
Investment Alternatives (QDIAs), there has been explosive growth in these target date funds. According to Morningstar (Furman 2013),7 total target date fund
assets reached $475 billion by November 2012—a four-fold increase since the passage of the PPA. In practice each fund family has its own glide path, and most
have individual nuances. Yet as a rule, the glide paths are invariably designed so
that financial market risk in portfolios is decreasing in time-to-retirement. This is
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akin to the financial planning heuristic that one saving for retirement should hold
(100 − age) in equities or other similarly risky assets. The essential motivation here
is that as the DC plan participant is moving through his career toward retirement,
he is replacing the present value of future human capital with financial assets. In
the early years, with many years to retirement, the reservoir of this store of human
capital is large relative to financial assets and provides a buffer against market
shocks. As the individual approaches retirement, the relative size of the combined
portfolio = PV(Human Capital) + Financial Savings, tilts toward an increasing
fraction on the financial assets side. To maintain a relatively balanced risk position,
the mix in the financial portfolio (here the target date fund) decreases in risk as one
moves closer to retirement.
In practice, target date portfolios may have many different asset classes and gradations within each asset class. MarketGlide calculates indices of weighted-average
glide paths from 37 fund families (see Abidi and Quayle 2010). For our purposes we
use a simplified version of the glide path that maps assets into cash, fixed income,
and equities. This provides a relatively accurate representation of key risks as the
indices are dominated by U.S. aggregate fixed income and U.S. large cap equities.
As a general rule, asset classes with distinct dynamics, principally commodities and
real estate, comprise less than 2 percent each at any point along the industry average glide path. The glide path used is shown in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6. Simplified market average DC glidepath.
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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Our hypothetical participant starts his participation in our DC plan with a salary of $30,000 per year, which grows at a rate of 1 percent per year in excess of
inflation.8 He contributes 6 percent of pay and has a match of 4 percent from his
employer. Moreover, he is assumed to invest solely in the target date fund corresponding to the 40-year glide path.
The variables of interest are the plan account balances at various points along
his progression to retirement. Note that for each individual simulation, there will
be some path-dependency as the values grow by the contributions as well as asset
returns and the asset allocation is changing through time, so timing and order of
specific return draws can be very important. Table 3.1 shows the characteristics of
two hypothetical DB plans that we examine.
We assume both plans are currently 80 percent funded, approximately equal to
the funding level (81.7 percent) estimated for the Milliman Pension Funding Index
as of January 31, 2013 (Milliman 2013). The funding rules for contributions are
those as set out in the PPA.9 Unfunded amounts are subject to a seven-year amortization basis. Each year the amount of underfunding is compared to the rolled-forward
amortization bases. If the new underfunding exceeds the value of the unamortized
prior-year bases, a new basis is created with a seven-year amortization. Once a plan
is fully funded, all existing bases are erased. The required contributions are the sum
of the amortization charges from these bases and the plan’s normal (service) cost.10
For simplicity, we handled the plan’s current underfunding by assuming that equal
amortization charges were established in the current and each of the three prior
years. Funding levels are a function of both the plan’s assets and liabilities. In reality,
plan sponsors have some latitude in the yield curve used to determine liabilities—
this is currently even more the case given the rules promulgated by MAP-21 in 2012.
For our purposes we use an approach closer to the mark-to-market liability valuation
as set forth by the FASB for accounting purposes and use a point-in-time yield curve
rather than one that is a moving average through time.
Assets are rolled forward assuming asset returns per a 60/40 mix of stocks and
bonds rebalanced quarterly, less current year benefit payments. Liabilities are
revalued each year given changes in the discounting yield curve. We examine two

Table 3.1 Characteristics of DB plans

PV (liabilities)
0–10 years
10–20 years
20–30 years
30+ years
Duration of liabilities
Normal cost (%) of liabilities
Source: Authors’ tabulations.

Frozen plan

Accruing plan

$1.25 billion
42%
35%
16%
7%
13.8 years
–

$1.25 billion
32%
36%
20%
12%
16.5 years
5%
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cases: a frozen plan and an open accruing plan. For the frozen plan, benefits are
paid and the t+1 set of cash flows becomes the current year’s benefit payments (we
assume that the actuaries have perfect foresight into plan demographics). For the
accruing plan, we make the simplifying assumption that normal cost is applied pro
rata in future years. This yields a stationary distribution of liabilities which, as a first
order approximation, only shifts duration in response to changes in the yield curve.
The principal variable of interest is the value of required plan contributions. For
the DB case, we expect scenario results to be highly path-dependent. Unlike the
DC case where we had a time-varying asset allocation, here the path-dependency
is a result of the interplay between assets and liabilities (stocks and the yield curve)
and the contribution rules. Strong equity markets and/or large increases in the
discount rate can abruptly halt required contributions, and they may stay at zero
for some time. Poor equity markets/flat-to-declining rates, combined with benefit
outflows, can cause required contributions to increase and stay persistently high.

Results for DC Simulations
Results for our 40-year DC glide path are presented in Figure 3.7 and Table
3.2. Over time, we see a pattern emerging. The spread of the block bootstrap
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Figure 3.7. Total savings in DC plan.
Source: Authors’ illustrations.
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Mean
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15,122
17,341
18,513
20,363
22,490
24,564
27,003
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31,366
22,364

2018
14,079
16,619
17,911
20,103
22,639
25,180
27,688
29,366
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2018
14,820
16,603
17,725
19,907
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29,672
33,480
22,402
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Median
75 percentile
90th percentile
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99th percentile
Mean

Bootstrap ($)

1st percentile
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Median
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90th percentile
95th percentile
99th percentile
Mean

Normal ($)
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Source: Authors’ tabulations.

2018

Structural ($)

Table 3.2 Total savings in DC plan

27,836
32,775
36,096
42,079
50,538
60,067
70,093
77,677
94,584
50,408

2023

25,777
32,288
35,756
42,704
50,872
60,403
69,510
75,592
89,988
50,388

2023

30,537
36,168
39,179
44,014
50,207
56,930
64,669
68,642
77,712
50,103

2023

45,457
54,421
60,757
71,883
89,817
110,930
134,154
149,767
188,617
89,822

2028

41,732
52,603
58,710
72,530
90,233
112,530
134,961
151,949
187,266
89,801

2028

51,002
60,584
66,852
77,175
88,966
103,199
117,039
128,872
147,174
88,809

2028

70,568
86,520
96,957
116,552
145,566
182,323
227,201
252,908
333,923
146,573

2033

65,719
81,677
93,381
115,284
145,922
186,935
235,436
267,700
335,609
146,925

2033

83,016
100,360
108,428
124,257
144,981
168,051
192,388
206,481
245,714
144,339

2033

106,233
133,322
146,713
177,523
222,230
282,972
354,872
397,478
552,279
225,607

2038

96,981
121,999
140,008
173,771
225,470
293,122
366,077
434,956
552,169
226,834

2038

128,019
151,868
164,470
188,668
220,990
259,750
298,291
326,813
382,644
221,569

2038

153,494
194,091
213,807
263,153
327,427
418,014
531,657
604,754
814,311
333,430

2043

141,697
176,682
201,478
255,539
332,590
440,524
562,444
649,153
854,683
336,252

2043

188,575
216,685
237,206
273,212
324,748
385,915
458,437
504,899
590,109
326,856

2043

218,312
267,094
297,960
367,440
464,200
599,582
761,865
878,447
1,248,614
472,565

2048

184,930
240,333
278,002
350,723
467,660
637,955
850,329
1,016,471
1,349,915
477,879

2048

260,682
295,950
325,632
382,817
458,374
549,521
664,364
744,054
904,104
462,825

2048

276,610
348,871
395,908
487,140
634,796
856,484
1,105,678
1,320,910
1,945,710
652,603

2053

231,906
310,006
361,897
467,323
641,948
918,742
1,258,562
1,588,341
2,263,013
661,902

2053

335,884
397,964
432,843
514,899
629,008
778,129
952,725
1,076,167
1,431,140
638,618

2053
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distributions of account balances is wider than the spread of the multivariate normal distributions, which in turn is wider than those seen for the structural LHS
model. A similar pattern is seen when we examine the means and medians of the
distribution as we go out to the far years of the distribution. We might expect differences in the width of the distributions given the different generating processes,
but one must recall that the models were calibrated to have the same mean and
volatility of returns for any single year. Hence, ex ante, most readers would probably
expect the means and the medians of the distributions to stay quite close for our
entire horizon. But note that we are showing the means and medians of the distributions at each point in time, not the values corresponding to compounding the
mean or median single-year returns.
The same forces that give rise to longer-run mean reversion in returns in the
structural model affect the means and medians of the distributions as well. For
shorter horizons, these effects are small—even out to 20 years, values of medians
stay within 1 percent or less (means within 2 percent), but this drift compounds out
to 40 years where there is as much as a 4 percent discrepancy in mean account balances in the difference between the bootstrap simulations and the structural model
results.
Both tails of the account balances are also quite different. After 20 years, the
saver has combined employee and employer contributions of just over $92,000. In
both the bootstrap and normal models, he would expect that, almost 10 percent of
the time, his account balance would be less than cumulative contributions. Under
the LHS model, this would happen less than 3 percent of the time. The LHS model
produces downside accumulation results that are 26 percent better in the lowest
percentile of the distribution, and 23 percent better at the 5th percentile. On the
flip side, the LHS approach also produces smaller account balances in the good
scenarios. Balances are approximately 18–23 percent (26–27 percent) lower at the
95th (99th) percentiles than in the bootstrap and normal distributions.
It is also instructive to look at the implied geometric average returns in the upper
tails. For the normal and bootstrap cases, these are approximately 11 percent and
13.3 percent. These do not seem too extreme when one considers that the average glide path weight in equity in the first 20 years is roughly 85 percent. Yet they
may appear wider when viewed against the backdrop of current bond yields of less
than 2 percent on ten-year Treasuries, and also given that higher equity returns
have tended to coincide with periods of persistently moderate or declining inflation. A back-of-the-envelope calculation assuming he gets 2.5 percent from bonds
over the period would imply either 10.0 percent or 12.7 percent excess returns for
equities. This seems inordinately high for such a long period.
At the 40-year horizon, the bootstrap-driven model has the widest distribution,
with both more negative and more positive outcomes. It should also be noted here
that the asset allocation changes the most dramatically in the last 20 years of the
glide path. Equities drop from 78 percent with 20 years to go, to 44 percent at
retirement. The bond allocation rises from 19 percent to 45 percent.
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The lack of mean reversion in the bootstrap and normal models may be most distortionary here, since there is natural reason to expect negative serial correlation of
returns over the medium to longer term in fixed income markets. If a riskless bond,
which is held to maturity, returns less than its yield to maturity it must be followed by
returns greater than the initial yield to maturity. This mathematical fact is lessened
somewhat if we think about rolling portfolios and portfolios containing spread product, but for the investment-grade fixed income assumed here, these factors would
be insufficient to overcome the rationale for longer-term mean reversion in returns.
After 40 years, the account balances in the bootstrap simulations are on average
1.5 percent higher than those for the normal simulations, and 3.5 percent higher
than for the structural model. At the upper extremes of the distributions (99th
percentile) the bootstrap gives account balances nearly 40 percent greater than
those in the normal model, and nearly 60 percent greater than those seen in the
structural model. The implied annualized return is approximately 10.3 percent.
Again this number seems inordinately large over a 40-year horizon, given the mix
of assets and our current starting point. In the bottom percentile, the bootstrap
model lags the normal model by 16 percent and the structural model by 31 percent.
The persistent negative returns required to get approximately 1.8 percent per annum
seem implausibly low for a 40-year implied compounded average.
The spread for the normal model seems more reasonable by comparison, yet
it also spans a range where the 99th percentile outcome is almost seven times that
seen in the 1st percentile results. Its median and mean results are 1–2 percent
higher than those seen in the structural simulation model. For the extreme percentiles, the normal model is about 20–25 percent wider than the structural model.
In the worst percentile case, we again see negative nominal returns over a 40-year
horizon. Upside effective annual asset appreciations are 8.0 percent annualized at
the 95th percentile (9.7 percent annualized for the 99th percentile). This does not
seem terribly unreasonable given our horizon length and the fact that these are for
the extremes of the distribution.
The LHS model produces an annualized return of 0.8 percent in the worst percentile. This would be depressing, but much less so than for the other two models.
Results to the upside are more muted as well producing effective annualized returns
of 7.1 percent at the 95th percentile (and 8.4 percent for the 99th). It should be
noted, however, that annualized returns can be a bit deceiving in this context when
one thinks about the asset-weighted averages. Time-weighted, the averages have
substantially more exposure to equities, but when viewed against the construct of
the glide path and increasing reliance on bonds in the future, the average effective
weight is likely more closely balanced.

Results for DB Plans
Turning our attention to the DB plans, we first analyze the behavior of contributions across the three models for the frozen plan over a ten-year horizon. Recall that

50

Recreating Sustainable Retirement

asset allocation is kept at 60 percent equity and 40 percent fixed income with quarterly rebalancing. Under the contribution rules, median minimum required contributions drop to zero by 2017 (see Figure 3.8, Panel A). This is largely driven by the
upward drift in the discount curve, assumed to increase by 100 basis points on average
at the ten-year point of the yield curve and somewhat more for short–intermediate
maturities with the two-year rate rising by some 240 basis points. Average required
contributions stay positive in all years given the funding rules. For the first three years,
there is little difference across the models given the nature of the amortization bases.
Average contribution results differ a bit as we move forward in time, but even at their
widest they amount to approximately $6 million in ten years’ time, or less than 1 percent of current liabilities. At the 99th percentile, the potential contributions display
greater and widening variance. For 2014, the spread between the bootstrap and LHS
models is a little over $9 million. In ten years’ time, this grows to $61 million.
Panel B in Figure 3.8 shows a distribution of the present value of contributions
for the three models. Interestingly, all three models have average required contributions less than current shortfalls, given the central tendency for rates to rise. The
present value of average contributions ranges from a low of $170 million in the
LHS model to a high of $210 million in the bootstrap model. The bootstrap and
normal models display significantly higher distribution in the possible future contributions. This difference is again largely attributable to the lack of mean reversion
of returns in the bootstrap and normal distribution models and to the propensity
for a greater left skew in the historic return distribution for equities.
Contribution requirements for the plan still accruing benefits are more interesting (see Figure 3.9, Panel A). There is a similar pattern of mean and median
required contributions for the first few years, but then there is some divergence.
Means and medians stay positive, as additional benefits are earned while the combined increase in the yield curve and current asset levels are not sufficient to award
‘free’ additional benefit accruals. Interestingly, the medians and means diverge
most for the bootstrap simulations, with the bootstrap ultimately having the lowest median contribution requirements, but the highest mean requirements. After
the first few years, the bootstrap consistently produces the largest mean and 99th
percentile contributions.
Over the next ten years, the average present value of contributions for the open
plan ranges from $789 million in the structural model to $866 million in the bootstrap model. The normal model is in between, at $841 million. The bootstrap
model also displays the widest variation in contributions and a substantial tail
(Panel B, Figure 3.9).

Conclusion
This chapter examines three alternative methods to simulate long horizon yield
curves and asset returns: a ‘block bootstrap’ simulation, a normal ‘Monte Carlo’
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Figure 3.8. Contribution patterns under alternative scenarios: frozen plan.
Notes: Panel A: Minimum required contribution ($mm): frozen plan. Panel B: Distribution of ten-year
cumulative contributions. Panel C: Distribution of five-year cumulative contributions.
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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simulation, and a structural economic regime-switching model. We explore how
the choice of modeling approach affects the simulated distribution of future
returns and outcomes (such as plan contributions and retirement wealth) for both
DC and DB plans.
The bootstrap model has desirable properties for shorter simulations of
a few years or less, but it produces very questionable results for long horizons.
Examination on a path-by-path basis yields individual scenarios that strain credibility, both in individual variables and between variables. The normal model
with independently, identically distributed returns also fails along several dimensions. Over a longer horizon, fundamental tenants of economic rationality dictate bounds on valuations that would almost certainly rule out a true memoryless
process, which the normal and bootstrap models assume. The weak linkages
between variables that correlation provides are not sufficient to ensure reasonable long-term relationships. A simple correlation matrix cannot capture the
complex dynamic relationship between stock returns, bond returns, and macro
variables. These relationships are better characterized by a model that generates
correlations which vary with the macroeconomic regime, such as our proposed
macro-driven regime-switching model (LHS). This model captures many desirable properties at both the secular and cyclical frequencies and overcomes many
of the flaws of simpler models. The model also makes it possible to directly link
investment returns with simulated macroeconomic time series for inflation and
GDP growth. For this reason we would argue that the structural model should
be preferred for longer horizon simulations. The model can be used to evaluate
different asset allocations, market or macro-contingent dynamic asset allocations,
and hedging strategies.
A key implication of the LHS model is mean reversion of returns at longer
investment horizons, which implies a downward-sloping term structure of volatility. This feature or idea is supported by the work of Campbell and Viceira
(2005) and by Siegel’s well-known work (1994) on long-run stock returns. We
initially described the statistical uncertainty surrounding estimates of risk premiums and expected returns that may even vary over time. So, what is the equity
risk premium we are supposed to be converging to in the simulation? The task
ahead of us is to incorporate some essence of the uncertainty about the mean
processes (risk premiums) into our long-term simulation models (see Pastor and
Stambaugh 2012).
Our results and discussion should provide some cautionary lessons.
Characterizing distributions of outcomes ten or 40 years hence is an exercise
that should be taken with more than a single grain of salt. One should look
at such models (no matter how sophisticated) only as one among a number of
guides to answers, rather than the sole guide—or, worse yet, the answer in and
of itself.
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Appendix: The Regime-Switching Long Horizon
Simulation Model
Regime Dynamics
The transition probabilities between regimes are a function of the time spent in the
regime. Formally, it is assumed that the transitions are governed by a Weibull distribution. The survival function (the probability of staying in a given regime past time
t is given by S(t) = e (( t )/( a ))b, with associated probability density function f(t) = ba−btb−1
b
−b b−1
e (( t )/( a )) , and hazard rate function h(t) = ( f (t )) / (S (t )) = ba t . As discussed above,
we calibrate the parameters to match the empirical mean and standard deviation
of the durations of economic expansions and contractions.

Output Gap Dynamics
The output gap is assumed to follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process within
regimes. In a regime-switching setting the key feature of this specification is that
changes in GDP growth are going to be more pronounced at the business cycle
turning points.
dy = −κ y ,s [ y − θ y ,s ]dt + σ y ,s dt ⋅ ε r
Mechanically, the reason why the most dramatic changes occur around turning points is that it is typically at the business cycle turning points in the simulation
(where the regime changes from one to the other) that the difference between the
current output gap and the new ‘target level’ for the regime is the greatest. As a
result, extreme levels of GDP growth are going to be realized at the beginning of
a recession (from positive to highly negative) and the beginning of an expansion
(from negative/zero to highly positive).

Inflation Dynamics
Inflation is assumed to have two components.

π = π cyclical + π persistent
d π cyclical = −κ cyclical , s ydt + σcyclical , s δτ ⋅ ε π
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The first component is meant to capture excess ‘demand’-driven inflation.
Its behavior is strongly linked to the output gap. It is in other words a short-term
Phillips-type inflation vs. aggregate demand relationship.
d π persistent = −κ π ,s ( π persistent − θ π )dt + σ π ,s dt ⋅ ε π
The second component is a very low frequency/almost permanent component
of inflation. This component captures secular changes in inflation levels in the
economy.

The Taylor Rule for Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a modified Taylor rule, such that the targeted
short-term real rate responds to deviations of inflation from its long-run level and
the output gap.
r = (r * + π ) + β π ( π − πlong ) − β y ,s [ y − ylong ]
Monetary policy is neutral when the current inflation equals the current value
for the time-varying long-term component of inflation. This captures the notion
that a substantial increase in long-run inflation expectations and average future
realized inflation has to be a monetary phenomenon. On a path toward higher
inflation, which would correspond to a shock in the permanent component of
inflation, we would expect to see ‘unsustainable’ or overly accommodating levels of
(low) short-term real rates of interest. It is implausible for real policy rates to remain
very high during inflationary periods. The general cyclical dynamics of monetary
policy in the model are however determined by the business cycle. In recessions the
central bank cuts real rates, and in expansions the central bank tightens, increasing
real short-term rates.

The Yield Curve Model
The nominal yield at maturity T is given by the average expected future short rate
plus a nominal risk premium minus a nominal rate volatility convexity adjustment.
The real yield for maturity T is given by the average expected future short real rates

56

Recreating Sustainable Retirement

plus a real risk premium (which may be negative) plus a liquidity risk premium–real
rate volatility convexity adjustment. Mathematically, the nominal yield at time T
can be written as
1
yT = E 
T



T

∑r  + δ
j =1

j



T

+ θT − γ T

where r is the short rate (three-month T-Bill), δ is the real rate risk premium for
maturity T, θT is the duration/inflation risk premium, and γ T is the convexity
adjustment at maturity T. The real rate risk premium is driven by the business cycle
in that we relate it to the output gap and is given by:

δT = α δ ,T + βδ ,T ygap + 
βδ ,T is assumed to be positive, which captures the positive correlation between the
real risk premium and the output gap. This captures the ‘flight-to-safety’ characteristics of U.S. securities in general and U.S. Treasuries in particular. The nominal
duration (inflation) risk premium is given by:
θT = α θ,T + βθ,T π inf + 
Since βθ ,T is assumed to be positive, we generally expect a positive correlation
between the inflation risk premium and the level of inflation. The convexity adjustments to the nominal and real yield curves are simply given by the conventional
expression of:
1
γ T = T 2 σ2
2
The convexity adjustment plays a significant role in shaping the longer-term
maturities of the yield curve, but does not in itself affect the expected term
premium.
Overall the dynamics of the shorter end of the curve (maturities inside five years)
are heavily influenced by the business cycle and the expected federal funds rate.

The Equity Model
Equities are priced according to discounted dividend model with a terminal
condition:
 30
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The equity risk premium is assumed to follow a regime-switching process
(Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process). Each regime is characterized by a mean, volatility,
and mean reversion parameter.

Equity Risk Premium
The dynamics of the equity risk premium are specified as an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck
process that depends on the regime (contraction or expansion) that the economy is
currently in. Formally,
d λ erp = −κ s ,erp  λ erp − θ j ,erp  dt + σ s ,erp dt ⋅ ε erp
The parameters of the model are calibrated to generate higher volatility in
recessions and more violent changes in equity risk premiums around business cycle
turning points.
This means that the parameters satisfy the following conditions: θcontraction,erp >
θexpansion,erp, κcontraction,erp > κexpansion,erp, σcontraction,erp > σexpansion,erp. The first condition ensures
that the P/E ratio will tend to decline when the economy goes into a recession. The
second condition means that changes in P/E ratios are asymmetric in that they
decline faster in recessions than they improve in expansions. The final condition
gives more idiosyncratic volatility in the recession phase of the business cycle. This
is consistent with the skewness of empirical equity returns where the left tail of
equity returns is ‘fatter’ than the right tail and consistent with higher market volatility and uncertainty in recessions.

The Terminal Condition on Equity Valuations
In steady state the expected return on equity should equal the required rate of
return on equity. We impose this condition to pin down the expected terminal valuation of equities, beyond the 30-year forecasting horizon at each ‘node’ in the
simulation.
PT = ET / (r + λ )
The steady state condition can be derived as follows. The terminal expected
price level is PT = dT / (r + λ−gD), where d is dividends, r is long-term interest rate,
and roe is the return on equity. Now use the fact that dT = poT eT , g D = (1 − poT ) roe ,
and impose roe = r + λ in equilibrium.

A Note on Expectations in the Model
The complicated regime-switching dynamics of the model do not admit a
closed-form solution for expected future fed funds rate, real GDP growth and
inflation at any given ‘simulation node’ in the simulation. To deal with this issue,
the expected future values of a specific variable are set to model consistent linear
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functions (projections) onto the most relevant current state variables in the model.
The expected future fed funds rate at a given point in time in a given regime is for
instance based on the linear projection of future simulated realizations of the fed
funds rate, the current fed funds rate, the current level of cyclical and persistent
inflation, and the current output gap for a given set of model parameters. To get a
term structure of expectations at a given point in time, the parameters for a given
variable vary at different forecast horizons, which are one, two, three, four, five,
seven, ten, 20, and 30 years. The expectations are in this way by construction ‘unbiased,’ conditional on the current state of the economy.

Notes
1. In practice, most modern implementations would extend to a broader array of asset
classes (e.g. real estate, commodities, private equity, hedge funds, etc.). The reduced set
of asset classes is chosen to reduce complexity of computation and to focus development
of intuition.
2. Data are taken from Robert Shiller’s (2013) website for 1871–2010 and from Bloomberg
(2013) thereafter.
3. In nominal terms, the corresponding average ranges are ten-year rolling: (1.7 percent)–20.4 percent; 30-year rolling: 5.2 percent–13.6 percent; Full Sample
Average: 8.7 percent. On a cumulative basis using Shiller’s CPI series, nearly 60 percent
of the cumulative inflation has occurred in the past 30 years.
4. Discussed in Moore (2011).
5. p is the probability if in the high state to stay in that state, 1−p is the probability of
transition to the low state. Symmetric results hold for q with respect to the low and
high states.
6. Schaus (2010) provides a thorough treatment of the design and motivations behind DC
glide paths.
7. Furman (2013) cites sources at Morningstar in her January 13, 2013, New York Daily News
article.
8. For the Multivariate Normal and Bootstrap models inflation is assumed to be 3 percent
over the period. For the Nested Structural model, inflation is a stochastic process which
drives yield curve dynamics and feeds into equity valuations. Here the process is calibrated to a long-run mean of 3 percent.
9. This analysis assumes zero funding balances (Prefunding Balance and Funding
Standard Carryover Balance), which impacts the funding ratio and minimum required
contribution.
10. Provided the plan is underfunded or 100 percent funded. If the plan is overfunded, the
required contribution is Max (Normal Cost – Overfunding,0).
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